Ajit Kumar Singh

The overnight clashes of October 11–12, 2025, along the volatile 2,640-kilometre Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan marked one of the deadliest confrontations in recent years, resulting in several deaths and reigniting deep-seated tensions across South Asia. The violence followed Pakistan’s controversial airstrike in Kabul on October 9, 2025, which Islamabad claimed targeted Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Noor Wali Mehsud. The attack, however, allegedly struck a crowded civilian market, killing at least 15 non-combatants.

The incident triggered a spiral of artillery exchanges, drone strikes, and cross-border incursions across Pakistan’s northern sectors, particularly in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Paktika provinces. By dawn on October 12, heavy smoke was visible over Pakistan’s Bajaur and Khyber districts, as satellite imagery captured destroyed outposts and damaged fencing. The fighting also paralyzed vital trade arteries, including the Torkham and Spin Boldak crossings that handle over USD 2.5 billion in annual bilateral commerce, leaving thousands of traders stranded and compounding the economic distress in both countries. As of October 13, a fragile ceasefire mediated by Saudi and Qatari officials was in place, but hostility persisted.

Pakistan’s military swiftly characterised its actions as defensive operations, framing its response as a legitimate countermeasure to what it called “unprovoked Taliban aggression” against more than 20 border checkpoints. The Inter-Services Public Relations detailed a series of precision airstrikes and commando raids that reportedly neutralised over 200 Taliban fighters and associated TTP operatives, while dismantling 21 Afghan positions and several terrorist training camps inside Afghan territory. Islamabad confirmed the deaths of 23 Pakistani Security Force (SF) personnel and injuries to 29 others. 

Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi denounced the Afghan actions as “barbaric and unprovoked,” vowing a calibrated response. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry summoned the Afghan Ambassador, condemning Kabul for providing sanctuary to TTP cadres, while denying that its October 9 airstrike had violated Afghan airspace. Pakistan further invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter, asserting that its crossborder actions constituted legitimate self-defence.

The Taliban administration in Kabul offered a starkly different account, depicting the clashes as a justified retaliation against blatant Pakistani violations of Afghan sovereignty. The Defense Ministry confirmed retaliatory strikes on Pakistani border outposts as a response to the October 9 bombing that killed civilians. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid claimed that their forces eliminated 58 Pakistani soldiers while sustaining only nine fatalities, portraying the outcome as proof of Afghan military superiority.

The Taliban described the confrontation as a defence of the Islamic Emirate’s territorial integrity against Islamabad’s “imperialist encroachments,” vowing to protect the Afghan side of the Durand Line, which they continue to reject as an artificial colonial boundary. While independent verification remains limited, reports from local Pashtun networks indicated that Taliban units briefly overran some Pakistani border posts.

By midday on October 12, artillery exchanges subsided following urgent mediation by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Riyadh, leveraging its extensive financial and religious influence, pressured both sides to cease hostilities, warning that instability could jeopardise Hajj pilgrim logistics and USD 10 billion in Gulf remittances to the region. Qatar complemented these efforts by hosting virtual talks, invoking its past role in the Doha Accords. Both Kabul and Islamabad accepted the ceasefire, with Taliban Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi crediting Saudi and Qatari diplomacy for “averting a greater calamity.” Nevertheless, the truce remained fragile. On October 13, Torkham remained closed, halting an estimated USD 50 million in daily truck traffic. United Nations observers reported approximately 5,000 displaced civilians, primarily Pashtuns, caught in the crossfire.

The record of Afghanistan–Pakistan border clashes dates back to April 2007, when the first SF-to-SF confrontation erupted over disputed outposts, establishing a pattern of recurring violence driven by fencing disputes and militant infiltration. According to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) data, at least 39 such incidents occurred up to October 10, 2025, causing 60 deaths on the Pakistani side — 41 SF personnel and 19 civilians. The Durand Line continues to represent one of South Asia’s most combustible borders. As of 2025, Pakistan reports 98 per cent completion of its border fence, a project that has repeatedly triggered Afghan opposition. In 2024 alone, 16 SF-to-SF confrontations were documented, resulting in eight Pakistani deaths (five SF personnel and three civilians) and 24 persons injured – all SF personnel. Afghanistan acknowledged 19 deaths (eight SF and 11 civilians) and 25 military personnel injured in 2024.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees assessments highlight that such periodic exchanges have displaced thousands of civilians annually, further eroding confidence in bilateral security arrangements. The first nine months of 2025 recorded 12 SF-to-SF clashes before the October 11 escalation, resulting in three Pakistani SF fatalities and nine injured (six SF and three civilians). Kabul’s official tallies for the same period included one SF fatality and six injured (three civilian and three military). Analysts correlate the Taliban’s 2021 return to power with a 25 per cent uptick in such encounters, attributed to Pakistan’s USD 500 million fencing project.

Beyond state-on-state engagements, cross-border militant infiltration from Afghan territory into Pakistan has surged, primarily involving TTP operatives. SATP data shows 17 infiltration attempts in 2025 (up to October 10), resulting in 202 fatalities – 194 militants killed during counter-operations and eight Pakistani SF deaths – along with 33 injured (25 SF and eight militants). This represents a marked escalation from 2024, which recorded 19 attacks causing 74 deaths (68 militants and six SF personnel) and 14 injured (nine SF and five militants).

These infiltration attempts, largely launched from Afghan provinces such as Kunar and Nangarhar, embody Pakistan’s core grievance that Kabul tolerates TTP sanctuaries. Islamabad cites this evidence to justify its “hot pursuit” doctrine of limited cross-border strikes. The persistent threat has also imposed economic costs: repeated Torkham closures in 2025 have already inflicted USD 300 million in trade losses. While Pashtun leaders denounce the fencing as a “wall of shame,” Pakistani military officials insist it is a defensive necessity.

Saudi Arabia’s and Qatar’s mediation has proven central to preventing further escalation. Building on earlier interventions, Riyadh dispatched senior envoys, linking restraint to prospective USD 1.5 billion in bailout funding and Afghan wheat support. Kabul reciprocated by promising to restrict TTP crossborder movement. Qatar hosted a trilateral video dialogue, proposing the establishment of joint border monitors. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan publicly thanked the Gulf mediators. However, as of October 13, the implementation of joint patrols had yet to begin, illustrating the ceasefire’s fragility. Analysts interpret the Gulf mediation as motivated partly by the protection of Gulf investments in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, and regional Hajj security concerns.

At the centre of these developments was the ongoing visit of Taliban Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to India, which ran from October 9 to 16, 2025. The visit, the highest-level Taliban delegation to India since 2021, took place amid the border crisis and underscored Kabul’s attempt to diversify its diplomatic ties. Muttaqi met External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in New Delhi, where both sides agreed to elevate India’s Kabul mission to full embassy status and reopen USD 500 million in humanitarian corridors for Afghan aid. In joint statements, Muttaqi expressed Afghanistan’s “enduring affinity” for India and interest in channelling USD three billion investments through Iran’s Chabahar Port to bypass Pakistani trade routes. 

During an October 12 Press Conference, Muttaqi criticised Pakistan’s “rogue elements” for fostering Islamic State-Khorasan Province networks and warned that Afghanistan would safeguard its sovereignty if Islamabad rejected dialogue. His remarks drew sharp reactions in Pakistan, where officials accused India of orchestrating Kabul’s rhetoric to isolate Islamabad diplomatically.

The Taliban regime in Afghanistan has intensified accusations against Pakistan for sponsoring Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) terrorism to destabilize the country, alleging that Pakistan’s InterServices Intelligence provides safe havens, training camps, and logistical aid across the porous Durand Line border, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These claims escalated amid 2025 border clashes, with Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid warning on October 12, 2025, that Pakistan ignores Islamic State presence on its soil, demanding expulsion of key members and revealing recruit funnelling through Karachi and Islamabad airports for attacks planned from there. 

On September 11, Taliban’s intelligence chief Abdul Haq Wasiq stated that ‘foreign powers’, implying Pakistan, dispatch IS-KP operatives abroad, noting that the group holds no Afghan territory but poses an external threat warranting international action. According to reports, IS-KP mounted 24 attacks in

Afghanistan in 2024, killing 135 civilians and 22 Taliban fighters; 16 IS fighters were also killed in these operations. These attacks dropped to 11 in 2025 (till October 12), with two civilian and 35 Taliban fatalities, as well as 11 IS terrorists – signalling reduced civilian tolls but persistent regime assaults, amid bolstered defences. Pakistan counters that Taliban-controlled Afghanistan harbours TTP militants, fuelling mutual reprisals and proxy war fears that threaten regional stability.

Muttaqi’s visit signalled a strategic recalibration in Afghanistan’s regional posture, shifting from historical dependence on Pakistan toward engagement with India. Pakistan denounced the India–Afghanistan joint communiqué as a “malign diversion” and expelled several Afghan diplomats in protest. The timing of the visit, coinciding with the Durand Line clashes, amplified its geopolitical weight.

The diplomatic shifts now risk redefining South Asia’s security equilibrium. Pakistan, once the principal sponsor of the Taliban, finds itself in open confrontation with the forces it helped ascend to power in Kabul. Economically, India’s renewed engagement with Afghanistan offers Kabul a pathway to bypass Pakistani toll routes. Yet the regional security fallout has already been tangible: TTP attacks in Pakistan surged following Muttaqi’s India meetings. Observers note that, while Saudi and Qatari diplomacy may temporarily calm tensions, lasting peace along the Durand Line will require verifiable Taliban action against TTP sanctuaries and sustained bilateral dialogue, including talks reopening the issue of the permanent border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The October 2025 border crisis encapsulates the fragility of Afghan–Pakistani relations, where overlapping insurgencies, disputed borders, and external alignments perpetuate instability. The Saudi-Qatari ceasefire has temporarily halted escalation, yet structural grievances remain unresolved. A Pakistan increasingly isolated by an Afghan–Indian rapprochement may intensify counter-insurgency as well as covert operations, risking wider regional repercussions. As Torkham’s gates tentatively reopened on October 13, a semblance of normalcy returned. However, until Kabul and Islamabad reconcile their divergent approaches to the Durand Line, terrorist sanctuaries, and trade sovereignty, the frontier will remain a powder keg. In the words of Amir Khan Muttaqi from New Delhi, “Afghanistan craves peace first — but its resolve is eternal.”

The author is a Senior Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management. This article was first published on  South Asia Intelligence Review at https://www.satp.org/southasia-intelligence-review-Volume-24-No-17